ABSTRACT
Following the rapid advance of technology in recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of studies on artificial intelligence. It is, however, relatively new to Turkish law. Developments in the field of artificial intelligence have led to new developments in the field of law, or to revisions in current legal areas, covering issues of artificial intelligence; one such area is intellectual and industrial rights law. This study will examine whether the products produced by artificial intelligence can be classified as works as defined within the scope of the Code No. 5846 on Intellectual and Artistic Works (“Code No. 5846”), and, through a discussion on the status of artificial intelligence as person, whether the products of artificial intelligence can be protected within this framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
The encroachment of artificial intelligence into social life has led to an increase in the debate on artificial intelligence. Studies carried out in 2016 predicted that the trade volume of artificial intelligence sector would rise from $8.2 billion to $70 billion by 20201 and this number is on the increase. Indeed, from driverless cars2 already in use in various countries around the world to machine learning used to improve health services,3 to online shopping sites that give advice on what financial products to buy,4 artificial intelligence appears in every aspect of our lives5. In addition, the new products, works and inventions created with artificial intelligence raise questions. All these issues require the legal ramifications of artificial intelligence from different perspectives.
One of the debates regarding artificial intelligence covers intellectual property law. In addition to the intellectual and industrial perspective of the type of legal regime that should be applied to artificial intelligence products, the debate also covers what provisions for works or inventions produced by artificial intelligence without direct human intervention should be applied. Currently, only works produced by natural persons are protected under the Intellectual and Artistic Works Code numbered 5846 (“Code No. 5846”)6. Within the scope of Code No. 5846, this study discusses whether artificial intelligence should be considered an independent “personality” and whether works produced by artificial intelligence should be protected by the Code.
I I . ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL PERSONALITY
The concept of artificial intelligence, first coined by American computer scientist John McCarthy, is, in the most general sense, defined as systems that can perform functions that normally require aspects of human intelligence such as perception, learning, development, creativity, communication, decision-making, and inference7. In other words, the concept of artificial intelligence, as a sub-branch of computer science, can be defined as machines capable of using problem solving abilities that are unique to humankind and of imitating what humans can do8. Accordingly, artificial intelligence is a human-created entity that is capable of performing and producing as humans do.Although there are other creatures in nature that can think, there is no living/inorganic form that can produce with human intelligence and within the scope of its will. In other words, intelligence is not only unique to humans; it is an ability found in many living things in the nature. However, as a rule, the ability to create intellectual works as a result of intelligence is unique to humans.
As a result of the development of the concept of artificial intelligence, the specificity of intelligence to humankind has become debatable. Artificial intelligence is not bound by the limits drawn to it; rather it acts in new ways and independently of those limits and produces things as a consequence of its activities. Artificial intelligence proceeds to the next step by using the information and documents uploaded to it by its producer as the “knowledge” and “experience” that a human would use during the production process of intellectual works and it creates a product. In Turkish law, recognizing products made by artificial intelligence as a “right” of the artificial intelligence is a legal matter as capacity to have rights and obligations is the consequence of legal personality.
Personality status in Turkish Law is recognized by law for natural and legal persons. But a short review of the issue in legal history shows that the concept of “legal personality” as an abstract personality emerged in a very recent period. Due to changing commercial, economic, and social conditions, the law/rules of law had to change to fill gaps created by the changing legal order. With the intensification of social relations and the increase of complex and continuous relations, abstract legal concepts were needed9. The emergence of the concept of legal personality is the result of the fact that the structure of society has reached a certain stage, that the idea of gathering has been born for a continuous purpose10 and that this purpose can be better served by an entity that has the right to be independent of natural persons. With the acceptance of the concept, being capable of rights and obligations has ceased to be unique to an individual and has become unique to “person”11. In a way, the concept of person has now lost the quality of being the one-to-one equivalent of the concept of a human.
Today’s technological and socio-cultural developments and changes make the distinction between natural and legal persons inadequate and debatable. Use of “intelligence” and discussions regarding the concept of personality in terms of artificial intelligence capable of independent production continue to take place. There are three basic positions regarding the personality problem of artificial intelligence. The first position is that artificial intelligence is property and therefore owned by its producer12. This position argues that artificial intelligence cannot have rights and powers and that it cannot be accepted as a “person” within the legal system; in other words, it can only be the subject of rights. In this context, artificial intelligence is accepted as the property of the engineer who invented it. Therefore the rights arising from any work being produced and developed by that artificial intelligence belong to the engineer. However, this opinion has been criticized for lacking in some ways. Even though artificial intelligence emerged as a product of a person, it cannot be seen as a mere property in situations where intelligence is used and produced independently of the one that produces the artificial intelligence itself15. That artificial intelligence is produced independently of its producer prevents us from accepting artificial intelligence as property.
Another position raised within the doctrine on the legal status of artificial intelligence is the view of slavery. According to this, even if artificial intelligence is not seen as a simple property, it cannot and should not go beyond the status of being the property of its manufacturer because it is a human made creature. Referring to the principles of slavery law as applied historically, this view is essentially based on the idea that it is not right to give artificial intelligence the same degree of rights as human beings and that, by granting artificial intelligence the status of slaves, the rights and powers of artificial intelligence belong to the man who owns the artificial intelligence17. In other words, this idea is defended on the basis of the view that artificial intelligence producers have the right to possess it because artificial intelligence is also the result of human labor. But the adequacy of accepting artificial intelligence that can make autonomous decisions and act independently as slaves of the human who produced it is also controversial. In other words, criticism of the idea that artificial intelligence should be considered as a property may be valid here.
Another new emerging position arguing artificial intelligence should be recognized as personality is the “electronic personality” view. This position argues that a new concept of personality is needed for artificial intelligence, as indeed the concept of “legal personality” was in the first place. In fact, a report of the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament dated 27 January 2017 recommended that artificial intelligence could be given electronic personality as a new type of personality independent of legal personality and natural personality. Supporters of electronic personality argue that economic rights should belong to the artificial intelligent unit. Subsequently, if that artificial intelligence unit were to cause harm, it would be responsible for compensating for the damage from that asset. So protection of third parties against any damage caused by artificial intelligence and its products shall be provided within this context. The “euRobotics” group defends that it should not be possible for artificial intelligence or robots with artificial intelligence to gain the legal status humans enjoy. However, this does not negate the possibility of creating a special legal status for artificial intelligence. Such a legal status for artificial intelligence would ensure that artificial intelligence is entitled to rights and obligations in the same way as legal entities. For example, in parallel with the legal entity, the assets to be acquired as a result of the product of artificial intelligence, including intellectual property rights, would be considered to belong to the artificial intelligence. According to this proposal, a regulation specific to artificial intelligence would be able to eliminate the existing uncertainty and confusion. cept of personality in terms of artificial intelligence capable of independent production continue to take place.
There are three basic positions regarding the personality problem of artificial intelligence. The first position is that artificial intelligence is property and therefore owned by its producer. This position argues that artificial intelligence cannot have rights and powers and that it cannot be accepted as a “person” within the legal system; in other words, it can only be the subject of rights13. In this context, artificial intelligence is accepted as the property of the engineer who invented it14. Therefore the rights arising from any work being produced and developed by that artificial intelligence belong to the engineer. However, this opinion has been criticized for lacking in some ways. Even though artificial intelligence emerged as a product of a person, it cannot be seen as a mere property in situations where intelligence is used and produced independently of the one that produces the artificial intelligence itself. That artificial intelligence is produced independently of its producer prevents us from accepting artificial intelligence as property. Another position raised within the doctrine on the legal status of artificial intelligence is the view of slavery16. According to this, even if artificial intelligence is not seen as a simple property, it cannot and should not go beyond the status of being the property of its manufacturer because it is a human made creature. Referring to the principles of slavery law as applied historically, this view is essentially based on the idea that it is not right to give artificial intelligence the same degree of rights as human beings and that, by granting artificial intelligence the status of slaves, the rights and powers of artificial intelligence belong to the man who owns the artificial intelligence. In other words, this idea is defended on the basis of the view that artificial intelligence producers have the right to possess it because artificial intelligence is also the result of human labor. But the adequacy of accepting artificial intelligence that can make autonomous decisions18 and act independently as slaves of the human who produced it is also controversial. In other words, criticism of the idea that artificial intelligence should be considered as a property may be valid here. Another new emerging position arguing artificial intelligence should be recognized as personality is the “electronic personality” view19. This position argues that a new concept of personality is needed for artificial intelligence, as indeed the concept of “legal personality” was in the first place. In fact, a report of the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament dated 27 January 2017 recommended that artificial intelligence could be given electronic personality as a new type of personality independent of legal personality and natural personality20. Supporters of electronic personality argue that economic rights should belong to the artificial intelligent unit. Subsequently, if that artificial intelligence unit were to cause harm, it would be responsible for compensating for the damage from that asset21. So protection of third parties against any damage caused by artificial intelligence and its products shall be provided within this context. The “euRobotics” group defends that it should not be possible for artificial intelligence or robots with artificial intelligence to gain the legal status humans enjoy. However, this does not negate the possibility of creating a special legal status for artificial intelligence. Such a legal status for artificial intelligence would ensure that artificial intelligence is entitled to rights and obligations in the same way as legal entities23. For example, in parallel with the legal entity, the assets to be acquired as a result of the product of artificial intelligence, including intellectual property rights, would be considered to belong to the artificial intelligence. According to this proposal, a regulation specific to artificial intelligence would be able to eliminate the existing uncertainty and confusion.
I I I . THE QUALIFICATION OF “WORK” IN RELATION TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS
Intellectual and artistic works are as old as human history but the recognition of rights and patronage to the owners of rights and the regulation of this area by law was only possible after the Renaissance period.24 As a result of the reproduction of ideas and works of art, regulations and various changes were made in this area. In Turkey, intellectual rights are regulated in Code no 5846, but the Code does not include a definition of intellectual rights. Intellectual rights in a broad sense include intellectual products such as inventions, utility models, and designs but in a narrow sense they are rights on ideas and works of art, which are subject to legal protection without any requirement for a prior condition such as registration. For legal protection of an intellectual product, it must first be the “tangible result” of the creative intellectual work of its owner. Hirsch states that “an intellectual product is important in the legal field only if it is a commodity which is subject to possession”.25 It should also be noted that the right we call intellectual property is not the state of the idea on materialized goods. Essentially the protected legal value is the idea itself. An intellectual right is a right over one's creations based on his/her thought and artistic skill. For this reason, it is important that the idea underlying the resulting product is original and the only one of its kind. What is protected under Code No. 5846 is the way in which an idea is expressed through26. The originality of the expression of the idea is not the idea itself, rather the way it is expressed27. According to Code No. 5846, an intellectual and artistic work is any kind of intellectual and artistic product carrying the characteristics of its owner and falling into the category as a work of either science and literature, music, or fine arts and cinema. In Article 1/B of Code no. 5846, work is defined as “all kinds of ideas and art products which are considered as works of science and literature, music, fine arts or cinema, which comprise the characteristics of the person(s).” A product, created as a result of personal effort, must contain the characteristics of the owner and must be listed among the titles listed as limited in the above mentioned article. However, every product formed as a result of personal effort is not treated as a “work” as there is no legal benefit in protecting a product as an artistic work that can be simply created by anyone with an average skill level.
The very general definition provided in Code no. 5846 is not very descriptive but the protection of an intellectual product as a work is subject to certain conditions based on the legal definition. These conditions are, in short, to contain the owner’s characteristics, to be perceptible by third parties, and to be included in one of the classes considered as works in the Code. In terms of Turkish legislation, a work should possess each of these conditions. The problem of whether artificial intelligence products constitute “work” should also be evaluated within the framework of these conditions. However, the fact that artificial intelligence can be considered the owner of the work independently of the person who invented it requires a detailed examination of the first condition of the work, which is “containing the owner’s characteristics”. The requirement for a work to contain the owner’s characteristics is an important point in relation to establishing a link between the owner of the work and the work itself. If there were no causal link between owner and work, the work would not be protected under Code No. 5846. Characteristics of the owner refers to the element of “innovation”, one of the basic principles applicable in the field of intellectual property rights. That the work should contain its owner’s characteristics is generally accepted as a subjective element. It is called a subjective element because it relates to the intellectual effort of the author and his/her ability to create. A work must present the “personality” and “individuality” or “creative contribution” of the owner28. Products that cannot be created by everyone, that is to say, products that have a speciality, must be protected and can only be described as works under the law. If a product is capable of being produced by anyone, there will be no legal benefit in protecting the product as it will not bear any characteristic of the owner. The characteristic feature that the work must have is that it is a characteristic that originates from the person who created it. Given this, as a result of the characteristics of work, the person who creates a work must be a “natural” person. According to Article 1/B of Code No 5846, the owner of a work is stated as “the person who created the work (...)”. Although the provision originally clearly referred to “the natural person”,29 in 2004, the word “natural” was removed by Code No. 5101, leaving the expression “person”30. But the extent of the term person within the regulation is controversial. It is not possible for legal persons to create and own works where the term work refers to the product of intellectual effort. As a matter of fact, legal scholars believe that legal person, as an abstract personality, cannot be considered the owner of a work due to its lack of creative thinking ability.31 Legal persons only have the authority to use or exercise rights arising from ownership of the work whereas bodies considered natural persons and therefore legal persons’ bodies can create works.32 Although the concept of a natural person was removed from the above mentioned Article, it is accepted that a person who owns a work must be a natural person as a result of the definition of work adopted in the Code. The 11th Chamber of the Court of Appeals has made several decisions in this manner33.
So how should the condition that “the work must contain its owner’s characteristics” be interpreted? Although legal persons are not awarded ownership of a work, they may, however, be owners of economic rights arising from the ownership of the works because the person who works as a legal personality, which gives characteristics to the work, is the natural person34. In other words, within the scope of Code No. 5846, the requirement for a work to contain its owner’s characteristics is provided by natural persons acting through organs of the legal person. This issue, which has also led to controversy over the personality recognition process to legal entities, is important for protection of works of artificial intelligence. In Turkish law, it is accepted that it is not possible for entities other than natural persons to produce works in the sense of Code No. 5846, nor is it accepted that entities other than natural persons, in particular legal persons, have ownership of such works35. However, it can be said that such a conclusion is reached because articulation of the Code, doctrine, and the decisions of the Court of Appeals consider the condition “work’s containment of its owner’s characteristics” to fall within the scope of distinction between natural and legal person. On the other hand, developing artificial intelligence and robot technology shows that non-human technological beings can produce products and works independently and autonomously. For example, musical works produced by artificial intelligence programs. How would a direct causal link be established on this musical work? Would the characteristics of the musical work be required to be based on the codes and skills of artificial intelligence itself, or would the person who produced the artificial intelligence be required to have given this work his/her characteristics? These questions should be discussed with consideration of the Code and the labor of the artificial intelligence that produced the work, as well as its ability to autonomously produce and make decisions. At this point, it is worth mentioning that there is an important difference between legal persons and artificial intelligence. Legal persons, as a whole, consist of natural persons and are controlled by natural persons. But this is not the case with artificial intelligence. Some types of artificial intelligence may act independently of the human who produces it and are able to produce a product. Therefore, unlike a legal person, artificial intelligence may be considered to have its own characteristics. In this case, an artificial intelligence which can make autonomous decisions can be considered the “owner of works” under the law if it has the ability to give its “own characteristics” to the product or work it produces. It would be a clear denial of developed robot technology and artificial intelligence if it were ignored that an artificial intelligence producing products or works independently of its manufacturer has its own characteristics. It can be argued that the characteristics actually belong to the first person who produced the artificial intelligence. Either way, at this point in time, the views put forward on this issue cannot go beyond the discussions currently provided in the doctrine. Considering the current regulation in Turkish law, it is clear that the most important element for a product or output to be considered as work is “to contain its owner’s characteristics”. Although only the expression “person” is used in the related Article of the Code, it is argued that the expression “person” is attributed to natural persons when the essential elements of the concept work are taken into account. Therefore, the conclusion must be that artificial intelligence will not be seen as a separate personality in the current situation in terms of Turkish law. In this case, unless a separate personality regime or legal regulation is envisaged for artificial intelligence, as stated in the doctrine for responsibility of artificial intelligence,36 it may be assumed that the person who produces the artificial intelligence will have the rights arising from the ownership of the work that intelligence produces37.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the development of artificial intelligence technology, a debate has arisen regarding how the works and products of artificial intelligence should exist under intellectual property law. In the framework of Turkish law, artificial intelligence is not subject to a separate regulation, nor are there any legal studies aimed at recognizing a personality type specific to artificial intelligence. In the literature, the quality of works produced by artificial intelligence are examined and evaluated within the framework of the distinction between natural person and legal person. In this context, it is argued that works can only be revealed by natural persons pursuant to Code no. 5876 because the conditions for a work, which include performing a creative intellectual labor and containment of characteristics of the owner, are unique to natural persons. According to this acceptance, since machines and computers do not produce products that reflect characteristics of human beings through a mental activity and a creative intellectual effort, products of machines and robots are not considered works in the sense of the Code. This approach, which does not include artificial intelligence products within the scope of the law, is far from producing a legal solution for potential legal disputes because, as mentioned in our study, the content produced by artificial intelligence, such as music, images, and text, has characteristics that may constitute a “work”. As a matter of course, it is not appropriate to evaluate such an important issue only through superficial arguments. In our opinion, until the legislator provides a specific regulation on this issue, accepting the person who temporarily produces artificial intelligence as the “owner of the work” would be the most fitting approach. However, considering that works produced by artificial intelligence are currently sold and subject to different legal transactions, the need for legal regulation in this field is increasing. Explicit regulations should be made about personality of artificial intelligence, and intellectual property legislation should be revised in relation to that context so that works produced by artificial intelligence may benefit from protection under Code No. 8746.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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CAHIT SULUK, ALI ORHAN, Uygulamalı Fikri Mülkiyet Hukuku Cilt II: Genel Esaslar Fikir ve Sanat Eserleri, Arıkan Yayınları, İstanbul 2005.
ÇAĞLA ERSOY, Robotlar Yapay Zekâ ve Hukuk, Oniki Levha On İki levha Publication, İstanbul 2017. ARMAĞAN EBRU BOZKUR YÜKSEL, Yapay Zeka Endüstri 4.0 ve Robot Üreticiler Hukuki Bakış, Aristo Yayınevi, İstanbul 2019.
KEVIN KELLEHER, “How Artificial Intelligence Is Quietly Changing How You Shop Online”, Time Business, 01.03.2017, https://time. com/4685420/artificial-intelligence-online-shopping-retail-ai/ (Access Date: 9.3.2020).
MATT MCFARLAND, “US clears the way for this self-driving vehicle with no steering wheel or pedals”, CNN Business, https://edition. cnn.com/2020/02/06/tech/nuro-self-driving-vehicle-houston-dot/ index.html (Access Date: 9.3.2020) MEHMET ZORLUEL, “Yapay Zekâ ve Telif Hakkı”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Vol. 142, 2019, p. 305-356.
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SINAN SAMI AKKURT, “Yapay Zekânın Otonom Davranışlarından Kaynaklanan Hukukî Sorumluluk”, Uyuşmazlık Mahkemesi Dergisi, Issue 13, Y. 2019, p. 39-59.
SOLUM B. LAWRENCE, “Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences”, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Y.1992, p. 1231- 1287.
ŞÜKRAN İNCE, MELIKE ZIŞAN ŞIMSEK & FATIH KAYNARCA, “An Evaluation of the Legal Liability of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics under Turkish Legal Regulations”, GSI Articletter, C. 21, 2019.
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B. J.COPELAND, “Artificial Intelligence”, 11 Nisan 2019 https:// www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence , (Access Date 12.02.2020). European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, European Parliament Re¬port with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robo¬tics, http://www.europarl.europa. eu/doceo/ document/A-8-2017-0005_EN.html (Access Date: 10.02.2020).
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FOOTNOTE
1 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, “Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copy¬right, and Accountability in the 3A Era: The Human-like Authors Are Already Here: A New Model”, Michigan State Law Review, Vol. 2017, Issue. 4, Y. 2017, p. 666; Liana B. Baker, “RPT-Tech moguls declare era of ar¬tificial intelligence”, Cited from: Mustafa Zorluel, “Yapay Zeka ve Telif”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği, Vol. 142, 2019, p. 307.
2 See Matt McFarland, “US clears the way for this self-driving vehicle with no steering wheel or pedals”, CNN Business, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/06/tech/ nuro-self-driving-vehicle-houston-dot/index.html (Access Date, 9.3.2020)
3 See Thomas Davenport, Ravi Kalakota, “The potential for Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare”, Future Health Care Journal, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 2019, p. 94-98.
4 Kevin Kelleher, “How Artificial Intelligence Is Quietly Changing How You Shop Online”, Time Business, 1.3.2017, https://time.com/4685420/artificial-intelligence-online-shopping-retail-ai/ (Access Date: 9.3.2020).
5 Yanisky-Ravid, p. 664-666.
6 Official Gazette. 13.12.1951, Number: 7981.
7 Yanisky-Ravid, p. 673; B. J. Copeland, “Artificial Intelligence”, 11 April 2019, https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence (Access Date: 12.02.2020).
8 Armağan Bozkurt / Başak Bak, Yapay Zekâ, Aristo, İstanbul 2018, p. 6.
9 Ömer Ergün, “Kişi Kavramı”, Dicle Üniversitesi Adalet Meslek Yüksekokulu Dicle Adalet Dergisi, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Y. 2017, p. 10.
10 Ergün, p.9
11 Solum B. Lawrence, “Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences”, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Y. 1992, p. 1239.
12 Seda Kara Kılıçarslan, “Yapay Zekânın Hukuki Statüsü ve Hukuki Kişiliği Üzerine Tartışmalar”, Yıldırım Beyazıt Hukuk Dergisi, Y. 2019, Issue 2, p. 375.
13 Sinan Sami Akkurt, “Yapay Zekânın Otonom Davranışlarından Kaynaklanan Hukukî Sorumluluk”, Uyuşmazlık Mahkemesi Dergisi, Issue13, Y. 2019, p. 44.
14 Lawrence, p. 1277.
15 As a matter of fact, see these sources regarding the fact that artificial intelligence, which is possible to be seen as an item as long as it operates depending on the generator itself, will differ if it is able to make autonomous decisions. Şükran İnce, Melike Zisan Simsek / Fatih Kaynarca, “An Evaluation of the Legal Liability of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics under Turkish Legal Regulations”, GSI Articletter, Vol. 21, Y. 2019, p. 36-37.
16 Kılıçarslan, p. 377.
17 Lawrence, p. 1260 – 1261.
18 Here, it is necessary to evaluate the concept of willpower not as the ability of man, but within the concept of artificial intelligence, which creates new products by not staying within the limits drawn to it.
19 İnce, Şimşek ve Kaynarca, p. 36.
20 European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, European Parliament Re¬port with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robo¬tics, http://www. europarl.europa.eu/doceo/ document/A-8-2017-0005_EN.html (Access Date: 10.02.2020).
21 Zorluel, p. 345.
22 Zorluel, p. 332.
23 Zorluel, p. 344
24 İlhami Güneş, Uygulamada Fikir ve Sanat Eserleri Hukuku, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara 2015, p. 20.
25 Güneş, p. 22.
26 Güneş, p. 59.
27 Levent Yavuz / Türkay Alıca / Fethi Merdivan, Fikir ve Sanat Eserleri Kanunu Yorumu, Seçkin Yayıncılık Ankara 2014, p. 65
28 Ahmet Kılıçoğlu, Sınai Haklarla Karşılaştırmalı Fikri Haklar, Turhan, 5. Baskı, Ankara 2019, p. 111.
29 In Paragraph B of Article 1/B of the definition of “owner of works” brought about by law No. 4630, it was assumed that “owner of Works is the real person who created the work”.
30 The concept of “real person” in the article of the law has been removed and only the concept of “person” has been used so that legal persons can have financial rights arising from the work. For more details see. Yavuz / Alıca / Merdivan, p. 65.
31 Güneş, p. 93-94.
32 Kılıçoğlu, p. 116-117.
33 Supreme Court 11. The legal department, dated 04.02.2015, based on the decision 2014/16277, decision 2015/1285 “Also Law No. 5846 No. 1. and according to Article 2/3, the owner of a work is the person who created it. Since the plaintiff is an institution established by law No. 132 and has a legal personality, it cannot be mentioned that the plaintiff is the owner of the work” in the form of case law. See for similar decisions. Supreme Court 11. Legal Department T. 25.02.2008, E.2007/227, K.2008/2175; Tekinalp, p. 144; Kılıçoğlu, p. 180.
34 Tekinalp p. 134; Güneş, p. 93.
35 Zorluel, p. 321.
36 İnce, Şimşek ve Kaynarca, p. 33 – 34.
37 Under the Article 9/(3) of Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, adopted in the UK,in the case of computer- generated literary, dramatic, musical or artisticworks, the owner of the work is regarded as the person who created the work. For more details see. Zorluel, p. 325 vd.
