I. INTRODUCTION
The IoT is a dynamic global network structure in which physical objects are equipped with sensors, software, and other technologies, enabling them to connect and exchange data with each other, other systems, and the internet without human intervention. From a legal standpoint, this concept represents the transformation of objects from their classic passive role into active agents that generate, process, and even make decisions within certain algorithmic frameworks. Today, many devices in our homes, from refrigerators and thermostats to security cameras, lighting systems, baby monitors, and smart plugs, can connect to the internet and be managed remotely. The primary purpose of this transformation is not merely to connect devices to the internet but to generate data through this connection to simplify human life, ensure energy efficiency, and enhance the quality of life by saving time.
Smart home systems have become an indispensable part of modern life with the comfort and control they offer users. For instance, a user being able to activate their heating system based on geolocation data before arriving home, monitoring their home’s status via a security camera while on vacation, or a refrigerator automatically ordering depleted items are tangible and measurable benefits of IoT technology. These systems are not only comfort-oriented but also socially beneficial; they offer proactive solutions in the care of disabled or elderly individuals, allowing them to lead more independent lives. Sensors that detect falls or assistants that remind of medication times strengthen the human dimension of technology. These technologies are supported as innovations that facilitate the use of property rights, encourage the efficient use of resources, and enhance an individual’s control over their living space.
However, these advantages are only one side of the coin; the other side involves the reality that these devices constantly, uninterruptedly, and often without the user’s awareness, collect data and transmit it to the outside world. The digitalization and opening up to the external world of a space like the home, where the expectation of privacy is highest and which is under constitutional protection, necessitates that legal shields be integrated into this domain with the same speed and effectiveness.
The purpose of this brief is to examine data breaches originating from IoT technology in smart homes from a legal and technical perspective, to evaluate cybersecurity risks in light of relevant legislation, technical vulnerability analyses, and current issues, and to present a comparative assessment with international practices.
II. DISADVANTAGES OF IOT AND DATA BREACH RISKS
In the shadow of the convenience provided by IoT technology lie serious security vulnerabilities, privacy erosion, and data breach risks. From a legal perspective, the most fundamental and structural disadvantage is that during the production and design stages of these devices, priority is given to functionality, rapid market entry, and cost, rather than to security by design and privacy by design. Smart home devices continuously process a user’s living habits, hours of presence at home, sleep patterns, audio and video recordings, and even consumption preferences. This causes the walls of the home to become digitally transparent, turning the home into a data factory. When necessary cybersecurity measures are not taken, these devices act as unlocked backdoors into the home for malicious third parties.
The risks are not limited to the technical malfunction or failure of the device. Such situations can be considered defective goods or services under consumer law. However, the real and often irreparable danger in the IoT world is the unauthorized access to or misuse of the personal data collected by these devices. A smart vacuum cleaner creating a detailed map of a home and sending this data to the manufacturer’s servers, or a smart television conducting ambient listening to create advertising profiles, digitally extends the classic concepts of the violation of the inviolability of the home and the secrecy of communication. Although the unlawful acquisition and dissemination of data constitute a crime under the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (“TCC”) in Turkish law, these violations in the IoT world are often invisible and can persist for long periods without the user’s knowledge.
One of the points where technical vulnerabilities lead to legal liability is default passwords. The extremely easy-to-guess passwords set by manufacturers, such as “admin/admin” or “1234”, combined with users’ lack of technical knowledge or negligence, make it trivially easy for cyber-attackers to infiltrate the home network. This demonstrates how critical the obligation to ensure data security (duty of care) is for both the manufacturer and the user in personal data protection law. The compromise of one device through a cyber-attack can create a domino effect, threatening not only the data on that device but also banking information on computers connected to the same network, private files, or other smart devices. In legal doctrine, it is argued that such a vulnerability should be foreseen by the manufacturer and that the failure to take necessary precautions—such as mandating a password change during initial setup—constitutes a service defect.
III. ANALYSIS OF CONCRETE INCIDENTS AND RELEVANT REGULATIONS
A striking example that materializes theoretical risks and provides a basis for legal liability discussions is the technical study conducted by Kandır et al. in 20221. In this study, penetration tests and security analyses were performed on a smart television and a modem widely available on the market and considered secure by consumers. The researchers found that certain communication protocols enabling these devices to connect to the internet and the local network (specifically UPnP - Universal Plug and Play) were left open and unprotected from the factory, without any authentication mechanism.
The researchers, without any physical contact or cable connection to the devices, managed to bypass their firewalls and gain administrative access solely through the wireless network. They were even able to remotely change the broadcast on the television and project a video from their own computer onto the TV screen. In the context of the TCC, this act contains the material elements of the crimes of unlawful access to an information system (Art. 243) and obstructing or disrupting the functioning of a system, or destroying or altering data (Art. 244). However, what elevates the risk in this case and directly threatens privacy is the fact that the microphone or camera on a device compromised in this manner could also be activated by an attacker.
This case proves how a device from a corporate brand, purchased and paid for by the user and assumed to be secure, can be transformed into a tool for espionage and surveillance if the necessary software updates, security patches, and correct configuration settings are not applied. Here, beyond the concept of a defective good under the Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098 and the Law on the Protection of the Consumer No. 6502, there is a hidden and dangerous security flaw originating from the design. The manufacturer should have foreseen that the device could be so easily manipulated and should have offered the UPnP protocol in a more secure structure. It should be accepted that any potential negligence is of a nature that would give rise to the manufacturer’s legal and criminal liability in the event of a data leak.
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND REGULATIONS CONCERNING DATA BREACHES
Regulations addressing these breaches and security vulnerabilities in smart homes are shaped in a multi-layered structure at the international, regional, and national levels, owing to the borderless and global nature of technology. The regulation that sets data protection standards worldwide is the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). Although the GDPR does not contain specific articles for IoT devices, it disciplines this area and indirectly compels manufacturers through its general principles. Foremost among these are the principles of privacy by design and privacy by default. These principles mandate the integration of personal data protection measures into the technical structure from the engineering and design phase of a device, and require the device to operate with the most restrictive data-sharing settings out of the box. Thus, security and privacy must be an integral part of the product, not a feature added later.
Furthermore, the Article 29 Working Party (“WP29”) in the European Union, through its published opinions and reports, qualifies device manufacturers, mobile application developers integrated with these devices, and social platforms where data is collected as data controllers, and requires obtaining the explicit consent of users.
In the United States, the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) has taken more concrete technical steps, imposing an obligation on manufacturers to add reasonable security features to IoT devices and to assign a unique password to each device at the factory (instead of a simple password). This requirement signifies the end of the “admin/admin” era.
In Republic of Türkiye, the primary legal basis is the Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (“KVKK”) and related secondary legislation. The data collected by IoT devices (IP address, MAC address, location, voice, image, usage habits) are undisputedly considered personal data under the Law. Article 12 of the KVKK imposes an absolute duty of care on the data controller (in this context, the device manufacturer or service provider who determines the purposes and means of data processing) to prevent the unlawful processing of data, to prevent unlawful access to data, and to ensure the preservation of data. This obligation covers all technical and administrative measures. However, the legislation in Republic of Türkiye does not yet include a specific and binding regulation that directly addresses the security of IoT devices, their production standards, or cybersecurity certification. Although IoT security is mentioned in the strategic plans and cybersecurity action plans of the Information and Communication Technologies Authority, the lack of a specific regulation with punitive sanctions for smart home devices leads to uncertainty in practice. Currently, breaches are attempted to be resolved within the framework of general provisions, the policy decisions of the Personal Data Protection Board, and the articles under the heading of information crimes in the TCC. This indicates that a punitive mechanism that comes into play after an incident occurs is at work, rather than preventive law.
V. CURRENT ISSUES AND PRECEDENTS
Despite the existence of legal regulations, the problems encountered in practice, technical inadequacies, and precedent-setting cases reveal the magnitude of the risk and the areas where legal protection falls short. The Ring camera incidents, which occurred worldwide and particularly in the US, have brought the seriousness of the issue to light. Cases have been recorded where hackers infiltrated internet-connected baby monitors and indoor security cameras, established voice communication with children, frightened them, or watched parents in their bedrooms. Legally, this is not just a data breach or unauthorized access, but also harassment, blackmail, and a severe attack on the most intimate sphere of private life. In these incidents, the primary problem was identified as users continuing to use devices with default passwords, but also manufacturers paving the way for this vulnerability by not mandating security measures like two-factor authentication (2FA). This has sparked debates on whether this can be evaluated under the manufacturer’s product liability.
Another legal and ethical point of contention is the detailed mapping of homes by smart robot vacuums via their sensors and cameras, identifying the location of furniture, and sending this data to the manufacturer’s cloud servers. This data provides in-depth and commercially valuable information about the size of the house, furniture layout, number of inhabitants, and even the standard of living. The sale or transfer of this data to third parties (e.g., advertising companies, furniture retailers, insurance firms) without anonymization poses a risk. Since users often approve long, complex, and fine-print privacy policies presented during setup without reading them, they are often unaware that they have consented to sharing their home’s layout. This raises the question of how functional and realistic the concept of explicit consent under the KVKK is in the IoT world. The requirement that consent must be given freely, for a specific purpose, and based on information is often reduced to a formal approval in technically dense digital contracts.
Another significant problem is the mismatch between the hardware lifespan of IoT devices and their software support periods. While a refrigerator or washing machine can be used for 10-15 years, manufacturers often cease providing security updates for the smart features of these devices within 2-3 years. Devices that no longer receive updates become vulnerable to known security exploits and remain on the home network as “zombie devices”. Legally, whether the manufacturer has an obligation to provide security patches for the expected life of the device is a new area of debate within consumer protection legislation.
VI. conclusıon
Smart home technologies and the IoT have established themselves at the center of modern life as an irreversible technological transformation. However, this transformation opens the doors of our homes not only to guests but also to cyber threats, data hunters, and the actors of surveillance capitalism. Technical analyses, academic studies, and concrete cases clearly show that the weakest links in this ecosystem are often the failure to take simple security measures and legal uncertainties. A security breach of a smart device can result not only in the loss of that device’s functionality but also in the exposure of one’s entire private life, financial losses, and non-pecuniary damages.
Following a legal assessment, it is concluded that placing the responsibility solely on the end-user/consumer is not compatible with the principle of equity. Manufacturers, who act as data controllers and derive economic value from data, must view the principle of privacy by design as a legal and ethical imperative. In Republic of Türkiye, it is crucial to supplement the general protective umbrella of the KVKK with specific, up-to-date, and deterrent regulations for IoT devices that define technical standards (encryption, authentication, update guarantees) and hold manufacturers directly responsible for security vulnerabilities. Otherwise, smart homes risk ceasing to be comfortable sanctuaries for their users and transforming into digital panopticons where they are constantly monitored, their data is marketed, and their privacy is violated. The law of the future must focus on establishing and protecting this delicate balance between the right to connect and the right to disconnect, between convenience and privacy.
B. KEY TAKEAWAYS
(1)In exchange for the operational convenience and comfort they offer, smart home technologies transform the home—the living space with the highest expectation of privacy—into a continuous data collection center, creating a fundamental conflict between technological benefits and the constitutionally protected rights to privacy and the inviolability of the home.
(2)The brief attributes the primary cause of security vulnerabilities in IoT devices to manufacturers prioritizing commercial interests such as functionality, cost, and speed-to-market over the principles of security by design and privacy by design during product development.
(3)It is determined that the current legal framework in Republic of Türkiye is of a general nature and that there is a legislative gap regarding specific regulations for IoT devices that would define technical standards, minimum security requirements (e.g., mandatory password updates, encryption protocols), and manufacturer responsibilities.
(4)Legal liability cannot be placed solely on the end-user; manufacturers who fail to take precautions against foreseeable risks, such as default and easily guessable passwords, bear responsibility within the framework of service defects and product liability under the Code of Obligations and Consumer Law.
(5)The functionality of the concept of explicit consent within the IoT ecosystem is questioned. Users’ approval of complex and lengthy privacy policies without full comprehension undermines the requirement that consent be informed and freely given, making the validity of consent in situations like robot vacuums mapping homes debatable.
(6)The incompatibility between the long hardware lifespan of devices and the short-term software and security update support provided by manufacturers turns these devices into vulnerable “zombie devices” over time, creating a persistent security risk for home networks and raising the debate over a manufacturer’s ongoing duty to provide security.
(7)The remote compromise of smart devices (e.g., smart TVs, modems) to activate their microphones and cameras presents a new dimension of threat that transcends traditional legal concepts. This demonstrates that the act not only constitutes information crimes under the TCC but also lays the groundwork for much more serious offenses such as violation of privacy, harassment, and blackmail.
(8)The brief presents international regulations such as the EU’s GDPR and the US’s CCPA as precedents for Republic of Türkiye. Specifically, the GDPR’s principle of privacy by design and the CCPA’s mandatory unique password requirement stand out as proactive and preventive legal mechanisms.
(9)It is emphasized that the risk of a data breach is not confined to the device itself; the compromise of a single device can create a domino effect, posing a serious threat to financial information and private data on all other devices (computers, phones) connected to the same network.
(10)The brief warns that without the establishment of effective legal regulations and manufacturer liability mechanisms, smart homes are in danger of evolving from comfortable living spaces into digital panopticons where users are constantly surveilled, their data is marketed, and their privacy is systematically violated.
