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MONOPOLIZATION OF THE AI SECTOR BY TECH GIANTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE ANTITRUST LAWSUIT FILED BY XAI AGAINST APPLE AND OPENAI

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MONOPOLIZATION OF THE AI SECTOR BY TECH GIANTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE ANTITRUST LAWSUIT FILED BY XAI AGAINST APPLE AND OPENAI

Competition
September 2025
OĞUZHAN BAŞAuthor
00:00
-00:00

A. Abstract

This brief examines the monopolistic tendencies of tech giants in the artificial intelligence sector within the framework of the antitrust lawsuit filed by Elon Musk’s xAI Corp. ( “xAI” ) against Apple Inc. ( “Apple” ) and OpenAI Inc. ( “OpenAI” ). Brief addresses the core allegations of the lawsuit, namely that Apple, in an effort to protect its monopoly in the smartphone market, has engaged in an anti-competitive collaboration with OpenAI, thereby placing competitors like xAI at a disadvantaged position in the App Store. In this context, the extent to which existing antitrust laws can address the dynamics of digital markets and rapidly evolving technologies like artificial intelligence is evaluated in light of international regulations and precedent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Artificial intelligence technologies have become one of the most defining innovation areas of the 21st century, with the potential to fundamentally transform social and economic structures. While this technology enhances efficiency and offers new possibilities across a wide spectrum from healthcare to finance, transportation to education, it also stands out as an area where major technology companies consolidate their market power. Platforms in a “gatekeeper” position, such as Apple, Google and Microsoft, possess the capacity to shape the future of the AI market through their established ecosystems, data pools, and financial strength.

This market power brings with it significant debates from a competition law perspective. Particularly in the United States, the Sherman Antitrust Act dating back to 1890 (“Sherman Act”), and current regulations prohibit the formation of monopolies or the abuse of market power by companies to impede competition. The potential for tech giants to sideline competitors by prioritizing their own AI products or those of their partners on their platforms has become a subject of discussion in both academic circles and among regulatory bodies. This situation raises the question of how antitrust laws should be interpreted to protect innovation and consumer welfare.

The purpose of this study is to legally analyze the antitrust lawsuit filed by xAI against Apple and OpenAI, to evaluate the anti-competitive actions of tech giants in the AI market in light of relevant legislation, judicial decisions, and current issues, and to present a comparative analysis with international practices.

II. THE MAIN REGIME UNDER COMPETITION LAW

Allegations of monopolization in the artificial intelligence sector are primarily subject to the main regime of competition or antitrust law. Antitrust legislation aims to protect a fair and effective competitive environment in the markets. In the US legal system, the foundation of this regime is the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade, while Section 2 outlaws monopolization, attempts to monopolize, or combinations for that purpose. xAI’s lawsuit is based on the allegation that Apple and OpenAI have violated both sections by combining their market power to exclude competitors. Concepts such as “collusion” and “abuse of monopoly power,” which are prominent in the case, are cornerstones of this Act.

A similar trend is observed internationally. The European Union, with regulations like the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”), has introduced strict rules to prevent large digital platforms from abusing their market power. The DMA imposes obligations on these platforms, such as the prohibition of self-preferencing, ensuring interoperability with competitors’ platforms, and data sharing. This approach, unlike the US’s case-based (ex-post) enforcement model, offers a rule-based (ex-ante) regulatory mechanism, aiming to intervene more swiftly in competition problems in digital markets.

In Republic of Türkiye, this area is regulated by Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition. This law, largely parallel to the EU acquis, prohibits the abuse of a dominant position and anti-competitive agreements. The Turkish Competition Authority has been pursuing an active enforcement policy in recent years, particularly concerning digital markets. The investigations it has conducted and the fines it has imposed on Google, Meta, and various e-commerce platforms show that Republic of Türkiye is also closely monitoring the market power of tech giants. Although no specific antitrust case concerning artificial intelligence has yet been seen, the Competition Authority’s general approach towards large platforms in digital markets indicates that similar investigations could be conducted in this area in the future.

III. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SIMILAR AREAS

While antitrust lawsuits specific to the AI sector are new, the legal principles underlying this case have long been debated and applied in other areas of the technology sector. How large platforms shape competition within their own ecosystems is a well-known issue for competition authorities worldwide. For instance, the European Commission’s (the “Commission”) decision in the Google Shopping case is one of the most significant precedents in this field. Commission deemed Google’s systematic favoring of its own shopping service in its general search results page as an abuse of a dominant position and imposed a record fine. This decision underscored that a platform’s self-preferencing would be considered a clear competition violation.

Similarly, in the US, the Epic Games v. Apple case brought the status of application stores (App Stores) under competition law scrutiny. Epic Games characterized Apple’s mandatory use of its own payment system and its 30% commission rate in the App Store as a monopolistic practice. The court’s decision created significant awareness of how closed ecosystems and app stores can restrict competition.

In Republic of Türkiye, the Competition Authority has similarly investigated issues such as e-commerce platforms unfairly promoting their own products in their marketplaces or engaging in discrimination based on data usage. These cases, where a platform owner manipulates access to the marketplace it controls to the detriment of competitors and in favor of itself or its partners, show parallels with the allegations in xAI’s lawsuit. Therefore, the legal jurisprudence developed for search engines, app stores, and e-commerce platforms will also be instructive in evaluating competition in the AI market.

IV. CASE FILE ANALYSIS: XAI V. APPLE & OPENAI (X CORP., ET AL. V. APPLE INC., ET AL., 4:2025CV00914, U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS)

1. The Merits of the Case and the Parties’ Allegations

The center of the lawsuit is the partnership established between Apple and OpenAI. This partnership offers Apple, which has been criticized for lagging behind its rivals in the field of artificial intelligence, the opportunity to integrate the most advanced AI capabilities—worth billions of dollars in R&D investment—into its operating systems. On the other hand, it provides OpenAI, which dominates the market with ChatGPT, a distribution channel through over one billion active Apple devices worldwide. xAI’s claim characterizes this alliance as an “anticompetitive agreement” and a “plan by two monopolists to combine their power to maintain their dominance in the sector”. According to the allegation, Apple, a monopolist with a 65% share of the smartphone market, is joining forces with OpenAI, a monopolist with over an 80% share of the generative AI market, to push all other AI developers out of the market. The default offering of ChatGPT on Apple devices is said to make it difficult for users to access alternative AI models and weakens the competitive strength of independent developers like xAI. It is alleged that this collaboration has a “market foreclosure” purpose that restricts innovation in the sector.

Within this general framework, xAI filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas on August 25, 2025. The primary claims put forward by xAI are concentrated on several points. First, it is argued that by integrating only ChatGPT into its iOS operating system, Apple grants ChatGPT exclusive access to billions of user prompts originating from assistants like Siri, thereby depriving rival models of vast amounts of data and slowing their development. Furthermore, it is asserted that Apple manipulates rankings on the App Store to deliberately push back successful applications like Grok and intentionally delays the approval processes for Grok’s updates, thereby undermining its competitiveness. Consequently, xAI claims to have suffered billions of dollars in damages due to these anticompetitive actions. OpenAI has dismissed the lawsuit as “part of Musk’s ongoing pattern of harassment”. OpenAI contends that this lawsuit is not a legitimate legal process arising from antitrust concerns but rather the latest chapter in a personal vendetta Elon Musk holds against OpenAI and its executives. The phrase “pattern of harassment” is used to suggest that this lawsuit is not an isolated incident but part of a systematic and malicious campaign. Antitrust law experts not involved in the case have noted that Apple could defend this partnership as a “business decision made in a competitive environment” and could cite “security or operational reasons” for the AI integration.

In its complaint, xAI bases its allegations on multiple legal grounds at both the federal and state levels. A discussion of these legal grounds and the associated claims is crucial for understanding the legal basis of the lawsuit.

The core claim is that Apple and OpenAI have entered into an agreement in restraint of trade, in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The purpose of this agreement is alleged to be the protection of OpenAI’s monopoly in the generative AI market by leveraging Apple’s monopoly power in the smartphone market, and simultaneously, the protection of Apple from competitive “threats” such as multi-functional platforms that offer many services similar to smartphones, like social interaction, financial services, e-commerce, and entertainment, by leveraging OpenAI’s monopoly power. It is argued that this agreement excludes competitors from the market, reduces consumer choice, and stifles innovation in the sector.

Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, xAI puts forward multiple claims. It is alleged that Apple has wilfully maintained its monopoly in the smartphone market and attempted to monopolize this market by entering into an exclusive agreement with OpenAI, manipulating App Store rankings, and delaying updates for competing applications. It is also argued that OpenAI has wilfully maintained its monopoly in the generative AI market and attempted to monopolize it by foreclosing a significant portion of the market through its exclusive agreement with Apple, thereby depriving competitors of billions of prompts from iPhone users. In this context, it is claimed that Apple and OpenAI have formed a joint venture to monopolize both the smartphone and generative AI markets.

Additionally, as the lawsuit was filed in Texas, there are claims based on state law. It is asserted that the actions of Apple and OpenAI violate the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983, both by entering into a contract in restraint of trade (Section 15.05(a)) and by monopolization (Section 15.05(b)). It is also argued that their actions constitute a “civil conspiracy to commit an unlawful act” and “unfair competition” contrary to fair business practices.

In light of these legal grounds, xAI requests that the court grant a permanent injunction prohibiting the anticompetitive actions of Apple and OpenAI; actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial, to be trebled as provided by antitrust laws, as well as punitive damages and/or restitution; pre- and post-judgment interest; an award of all costs of the lawsuit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and a trial by jury.

The legal process officially commenced with the filing of the lawsuit on August 25, 2025, and is currently in its initial stages. It is expected that preliminary processes such as the submission of initial pleadings by the parties, discovery, and procedural motions will proceed. As of the current date, the court has not yet finalized a schedule for the xAI v. Apple & OpenAI antitrust case in Texas, and further developments are expected to become clear in the coming period.

V. conclusıon

The antitrust lawsuit filed by xAI against Apple and OpenAI stands out as a case that embodies the fundamental challenges and turning points faced by companies against tech giants in the age of artificial intelligence under competition law. The lawsuit is more than just a power struggle among three major technology companies; it questions the power of platforms, which are the giants of digital ecosystems, to shape the future of innovation and the legal limits of this power.

The central legal issue in this case is how well traditional antitrust laws can be adapted to modern digital market dynamics such as data monopolies, self-preferencing, and closed ecosystems. Internationally, the difference between the US’s case-focused reactive approach and the European Union’s rule-based proactive regulations highlights the difficulties of establishing a global legal standard in a strategic area like artificial intelligence. In conclusion, this case and similar developments reveal that protecting a fair competitive environment in the AI market is not only an economic necessity but also a vital imperative for the sustainability of technological progress and social welfare.

B. KEY TAKEAWAYS

(1)The lawsuit filed by xAI against Apple and OpenAI presents a significant antitrust example of the tendency of tech giants in the AI sector to combine their market power in an exclusionary manner.

(2)Apple’s strategic partnership with OpenAI, through the integration of ChatGPT into Apple devices, severely restricts market access for competing AI developers.

(3)This case is being evaluated under the provisions of the US Sherman Act concerning both collusion and abuse of monopoly power, containing a two-pronged violation claim.

(4)xAI argues that Apple and OpenAI are jointly pursuing a “market foreclosure” strategy, which undermines innovation and negatively affects consumer welfare.

(5)Proactive regulations like the DMA offer faster and more structural solutions for protecting competition in digital markets compared to the US’s case-based approach.

(6)One of the prominent issues in the case is Apple’s use of its device and software ecosystem to grant privileges to OpenAI and disadvantage competing AI applications through its App Store policies.

(7)xAI’s claim is that the integration created by Apple and OpenAI makes it nearly impossible for new startups to enter the market and harms the natural functioning of competition.

(8)This case is directly related not only to AI but also to the jurisprudence on self-preferencing violations previously seen in search engines, app stores, and e-commerce platforms.

(9)Although no AI-specific antitrust cases have been seen in Republic of Türkiye yet, the active stance of the Competition Authority towards digital platforms suggests that such cases may soon be on the agenda.

(10)Establishing fair competition in the field of artificial intelligence emerges as a strategic imperative not only legally but also for the sustainability of technological development and social welfare.

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